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Abstract
Belief merging is an active research ﬁeld with many important applications. Most existing work addresses the belief merging issue
using a centralised approach. In this paper, we investigate a distributed approach to the problem of belief merging. The contribution
of this paper is two-fold: (i) we develop a negotiation-based model for belief merging, and (ii) we investigate the computational
complexity of the belief merging problem within the proposed framework. Through the proposed model of negotiation-based belief
merging, we will present and discuss several signiﬁcant logical properties and computational complexity results.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of KES International.
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1. Introduction
Belief merging has emerged as an active research topic with important applications in many ﬁelds of Computer
Science. The main goal of belief merging problem is to obtain the common beliefs from several belief bases. It is
applied in database integration1,2, information retrieval3,4,5,6, sensor data fusion7, coordination in multi-agent8,9,10,
and multimedia systems11,12.
Several approaches have been proposed for addressing the belief merging problem. In general, they can be clas-
siﬁed as either centralized approaches or distributed ones. The centralized belief merging approaches constitute the
major direction in the belief merging literature in which the merging process is considered an arbitration. The typical
approaches in this group include belief merging with arbitration operators proposed by Revesz13, belief merging with
weighted belief bases by Lin14, belief merging with integrity constraints by Konieczny and Pe´rez15, belief merging in
a possibilistic logic framework proposed by Benferhat et al16, and belief merging with stratiﬁed bases by Qi et al17.
The solutions induced in these approaches satisfy a number of rational axioms for belief merging. However, these
approaches are not without some shortcomings. In particular, they require a mediator without taking into account the
roles of the agents who provide the source of the belief bases to be merged and they assume that all belief bases are
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completely provided up front. These requirements are generally inapplicable in many multi-agent systems.
The distributed belief merging approaches aim to overcome the above mentioned shortcoming. In these approaches,
belief merging is considered as a game in which agents who possess the source belief bases are self-interested and
may act strategically. The agents merge their belief bases by following a pre-deﬁned protocol in order to reach the
consensuses among themselves18,19,20,21,22,23,24. An approach inspired by two-stage belief revision operators are pro-
posed by Booth18,19 . It has been subsequently enriched by identifying a family of merging operators by Konieczny
(see21). Another important approach is proposed by Zhang20 in which a negotiation model is built for the set of
agents’ demands represented by logical formulas. The negotiation is carried out by ﬁrst aligning all the belief bases
in their lowest priority layers and then iteratively removing the lowest layers of belief bases until the remaining layers
are jointly consistent or a disagreement situation arises. However, this approach suﬀers the drowning eﬀect and is
syntax sensitive. In22,24, we propose a solution for belief merging by negotiation, which can overcome the drowning
eﬀect, but it is still syntax sensitive. Moreover, our more recent work23 can overcome both issues.
While the literature of centralised belief merging has been quite comprehensive addressing both the rationality of
the merging operators and their computational complexity, there is a noticeable lack of results regarding the compu-
tational complexity of the distributed merging problems. It is another aim of this work to address this issue. In this
paper, we propose a model for negotiation-based belief merging in which the merging process is organised into two
stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the preferences over the set of all possible worlds are constructed from the stratiﬁed belief
bases, based on several ordering strategies. The second stage is a negotiation process which works on the preferences
constructed in the ﬁrst stage. Then, several logical properties and complexity results for the proposed belief merging
operator will be presented and discussed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some formal preliminaries. A model for belief
merging by negotiation is introduced in Section 3, in which we present a model for belief merging and a set of axioms
to characterize the negotiation solutions. Several computational complexity results are presented and discussed in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion on the future work.
2. Formal preliminaries
2.1. Stratiﬁed knowledge base
In this paper, we consider a propositional language L over a ﬁnite alphabet P and the constants {,⊥}. Symbol
W is used to denote the set of possible worlds, where each possible world is a function from P to {,⊥}.
A model of a formula φ is a possible world ω which makes φ true, written as ω  φ. With Φ being a set of
formulas, Mod(Φ) denotes the set of models of Φ, i.e. Mod(Φ) = {ω ∈ W |∀φ ∈ Φ(ω  φ)}. By abuse of notation, we
use Mod(φ) instead of Mod({φ}) for some φ ∈ L . We also use the symbol  to denote the consequence relation, for
example {φ, ψ}  θ means θ is a logical consequence of {φ, ψ}.
Let  be a binary relation on a non-empty set X ⊆ L . The relation  is a total pre-order on X if it satisﬁes the
following properties:
- ∀α ∈ X, α  α;(Reﬂexivity)
- ∀α, β, γ ∈ X, if α  β and β  γ then α  γ;(Transitivity)
- ∀α, β ∈ X, α  β or β  α. (Totality)
A stratiﬁed belief base, sometimes also called ranked knowledge base or prioritized knowledge base, is a belief
base K together with a total pre-order  on K. Stratiﬁed belief base (K,) can be equivalently deﬁned as a sequence
(K,) = (S 1, ..., S n), where each S i(i = 1, ..., n) is a non-empty set and for φ ∈ S i, ψ ∈ S j, φ  ψ iﬀ i ≤ j, i.e. when
i ≤ j each formula in S i is more reliable than the formulas of the stratum S j. Each subset S i is called a stratum of
K, and index i indicates the level of each formula of S i. It is clear that each formula in S i is more reliable than any
formula of the stratum S j for j ≥ i.
Given stratiﬁed belief bases (K,) = (S 1, ..., S n) and (K′,′) = (S ′1, ..., S ′m), we say that these belief bases are
equivalent, denoted by (K,) ≡ (K′,′), if m = n and S i ≡ S ′i for i = 1, . . . , n. Further, a belief set E′ = {(K′1,′1
), . . . , (K′n,′n)} is logically equivalent to a belief set E = {(K1,1), . . . , (Kn,n)}, denoted E ≡ E′, if and only if there
exists a permutation π on the set {1, . . . , n} such that (Ki,i) ≡ (K′π(i),′π(i)) for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Additionally, given any set S , we use ‖S ‖ to denote the cardinality of S .
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2.2. Computational complexity
In this section we brieﬂy recall some computational complexity classes, including the complexity class Θp2 (see
e.g., 25). We assume the reader familiarity with the classes P, NP and coNP. Some important classes in the polynomial
hierarchy are deﬁned in the following.
The complexity classes Δpk , Σ
p
k , and Π
p
k (k is a positive integer) are deﬁned recursively as follows:
- Δp0 = Σ
p
0 = Π
p
0 = P;
- Δpk+1 = P
Σ
p
k ;
- Σpk+1 = NP
Σ
p
k ;
- Πpk+1 = coNP
Σ
p
k .
In addition, the class Θp2 = Δ
p
2 [O(log n)] is the class of problems Δ
P
2 = P
NP which can be determined via a
logarithmic number of calls to an NP oracle.
We can now deﬁne the hardness and the completeness of diﬀerent complexity classes as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. Let C be a complexity class, and Q be a decision problem. We say that Q is C-hard iﬀ for any decision
problem P belonging to the class C, there is a reduction from P to Q.
For instance, a decision problem can be shown to be NP-hard by identifying a reduction of the SAT (Boolean
satisﬁability) problem to this problem. In general, in order to prove that a problem P is C-hard, we just need to prove
that there exists a reduction of a known C-hard problem to P.
Deﬁnition 2. Let C be a complexity class, and P be a decision problem. We say that P is C-complete iﬀ P ∈ C and P
is C-hard.
C-complete problems are the most “diﬃcult” problems in the complexity class C.
3. A model of negotiation for belief merging
This section presents an axiomatic model for merging stratiﬁed belief bases by negotiation. We introduce the
concept of mapping solution, which maps the preferences of agents into the layers, as a vehicle to represent the belief
states of agents and their attitudes towards negotiation situations. The belief merging process in our model is divided
into two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the stratiﬁed belief bases of agents are mapped to their preferences. In the second
stage, a negotiation between the agents is carried out based on these preferences. To this end, a set of rational axioms
for negotiation-based belief merging is proposed and a negotiation solution which satisﬁes the proposed axioms is
introduced. Finally, the logical properties of a family of merging-by-negotiation operators are discussed.
We start the work in this section by considering a set of agentsA = {a1, . . . , an}, where each agent ai has a stratiﬁed
belief base (Xi,i) in which Xi ⊆ LV, and relation i⊆ Xi × Xi is a total pre-order.
A negotiation game is a sequence of stratiﬁed belief bases together with the integrity constraints presented logically
equivalent to a formula. The set of all negotiation games from the set of agentsA in languageLV is denoted by gA,LV .
The negotiation solution is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3. A negotiation solution is a function f : gA,LV → 2W\{∅} which maps each negotiation game to a
non-empty subset of all possible worlds.
Note that we consider the negotiation solution of any negotiation game as a set of possible worlds instead of a
single one.
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3.1. From stratiﬁed belief base to preferences
In this section, we consider several ordering strategies from a given stratiﬁed belief base (K,) = (S 1, . . . , S n)
where {S 1, . . . , S n} is a partition of K w.r.t. the total preorder  such that ∀φ ∈ S i,∀ψ ∈ S j, φ  ψ iﬀ i < j as follows:
−maxsat ordering26: let rMO(ω) =
{
+∞ i f ∀S i(ω |= S i),
min{i : ω |= S i} otherwise. where ω ∈ W. Then the maxsat ordering
maxsat onW is deﬁned as: ω maxsat ω′ iﬀ rMO(ω) ≤ rMO(ω′).
−leximin ordering27: let Ki(ω) = {φ ∈ S i : ω |= φ}. Then the leximin ordering leximin on W is deﬁned as:
ω leximin ω′ iﬀ ‖Ki(ω)‖ = ‖Ki(ω′)‖ for all i = 1, . . . , n or there exists j ≤ n such that ‖K j(ω′)‖ < ‖K j(ω)‖ and
‖Ki(ω)‖ = ‖Ki(ω′)‖ for all i < j.
−vector ordering : let vi(ω) =
{
1 i fω |= S i,
0 otherwise. .
Then the vector ordering vector onW is deﬁned as: ω vector ω′ iﬀ vi(ω) = vi(ω′) for all i = 1, . . . , n or there exists
j ≤ n such that v j(ω′) < v j(ω) and vi(ω) = vi(ω′) for all i < j.
Given a preorder  onW, the associated strict partial order ≺ is deﬁned by ω ≺ ω′ iﬀ ω  ω′ but not ω′  ω.
An ordering Y is more speciﬁc than another X iﬀ ω ≺X ω′ implies ω ≺Y ω′. We have the relation among the above
ordering strategies as follows:
Proposition 1. Let ω,ω′ ∈ W, K be a stratiﬁed belief base. The following relationships hold:
1) ω ≺maxsat ω′ implies ω ≺vector ω′,
2) ω ≺maxsat ω′ implies ω ≺leximin ω′.
3.2. Negotiation on the preferences
Clearly, given a stratiﬁed belief base and an ordering strategy, one can easily partitionW into the classes of possible
worlds (W1, . . . ,Wk) where Wi  ∅, i = 1, .., n. Therefore, for each possible world we can determine the unique class
which contains this possible world. We deﬁne the index function as follows:
Deﬁnition 4. Given a total preorder  onW and X ⊆ W, the index function l of  over X is deﬁned as: lX :W→
N+, where for any ω,ω′ ∈ X:
1) lX (ω) = 1 if ω ∈ min(X,),
2) lX (ω) = l

X (ω
′) iﬀ ω  ω′ and ω′  ω,
3) lX (ω) ≤ lX (ω′) iﬀ ω  ω′,
4) If ω ≺ ω′ then there exists ω′′ ∈ X such that lX (ω′′) = lX (ω) + 1 and if ω′ ≺ ω then there exists ω′′ ∈ X such that
lX (ω
′′) = l(ω) − 1.
5) ∀ω′′ ∈ W, ω′′  X, lX (ω′′) = max{lX (ω′)|ω′ ∈ X} + 1
We use the index function lX (ω) to indicate the index of class that ω belongs to w.r.t the constraint X and relation
, i.e. lX (ω) = i indicates ω ∈ Xi. Note that the indexes are consecutive integers up from 1, and the lower the index a
possible world has, the more preferred it is, i.e. formally, given ω,ω′ ∈ W, lX (ω) ≤ lX (ω′) iﬀ ω  ω′.
Here, we deﬁne the solution mapping of a negotiation problem built from the set of preferences {1, . . . ,n}
achieved by the stratiﬁed belief bases and the ordering strategies, and a set C of models of the integrity constraint μ,
i.e. C = Mod(μ) and C is called the feasible set of the negotiation problem, as follows:
Deﬁnition 5. Given a negotiation problem G = (C,1, . . . ,n) where C ⊆ W and 1, . . . ,n are the preferences
of agents a1, . . . , an respectively, a solution mapping of G is a function deﬁned as: mG : W → Nn where mG(ω) =
(l1C (ω), . . . , l
n
C (ω)) for any ω ∈ W.
Because the index of each possible world in a preference is unique, we have the following proposition:
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Proposition 2. For each negotiation problem G, the solution mapping mG is unique.
Now, we present a set of axioms to characterize the negotiation solutions. Firstly, the Pareto Eﬃciency axiom can
be formulated in our model as follows:
PE. If G = (C,1, . . . ,n) is a negotiation problem with ω ∈ C, ω′ ∈ W and mG(ω) < mG(ω′) then ω′  f (G).
Note that the Pareto eﬃciency we mention here is the Strong Pareto Eﬃciency. It states that a solution is Pareto
eﬃcient if no one can improve its utility without causing another utility to be worse oﬀ.
Next, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom can be formulated in our model as follows:
IIA. If G1 = (C1,1, . . . ,n) and G2 = (C2,1, . . . ,n) are negotiation problems with C2 ⊆ C1 and f (G1) ⊆ C2
then f (G1) = f (G2).
The Symmetry axiom can be formulated as follows:
SYM. If G = (C,1, . . . ,n) and Gπ = (C,π(1), . . . ,π(n)) are negotiation problems with π being any permutation
on {1, . . . n} then mG(ω) = (mGπ (ω))π.
Obviously, the Invariant to equivalent utility representations axiom is applied to Aﬃne spaces, while in this paper, we
are working on ordinal spaces, thus it is omitted.
The Upper bound axiom can be formulated as follows:
UB. Given a negotiation problem G = (C,1, . . . ,n) and two possible outcomes ω1, ω2 ∈ C. If max mG(ω1) <
max mG(ω2) then ω2  f (G).
We say that ω1, ω2 ∈ W is upper bound equal iﬀ max mG(ω1) = max mG(ω2).
The Upper bound axiom ensures that the negotiation process will be terminated immediately when an agreement
is reached.
The Majority axiom can be formulated as follows:
MA. Given a negotiation problem G = (C,1, . . . ,n) and outcomes ω1, ω2 ∈ C that are upper bound equal, if
‖{i : ω1 i ω2}‖ < ‖{i : ω2 i ω1}‖ then ω1  f (G).
We also say that ω1, ω2 ∈ W are majority equal iﬀ ω1, ω2 are upper bound equal and ‖{i : ω1 i ω2}‖ = ‖{i :
ω2 i ω1}‖.
The Majority axiom states that if two feasible worlds ω and ω′ are upper bound equal, whichever one is voted by
the larger number of participants, is preferred to be the solution. Although the majority property is studied in a wide
range of works in Social Choice as well as Decision-making, it is usually criticized by being aﬀected by the voting
paradox. However, it is not a serious problem in our work because if the paradox happens, we can take all the feasible
worlds as the outcomes. Lastly, the Lower bound axiom can be formulated as follows:
LB. Given a negotiation problem G = (C,1, . . . ,n) and two possible outcomes ω1, ω2 ∈ C. If ω1 and ω2 are
majority equal and min mG(ω1) < min mG(ω2) then ω1  f (G).
The Lower bound axiom ensures the solution is fair in the sense that the diﬀerence between the best and the worst
is minimal.
Given a set of possible outcomes S , we use max(S , #) to denote the subset of possible outcomes of S which is most
supported by agents w.r.t cardinality. Formally, we have:
max(S , #) = {ω ∈ S : ω′ ∈ S (‖{i : ω′ i ω}‖ < ‖{i : ω i ω′}‖)}.
We also denote G as the set of all negotiation problems.
Now, we show the possibility of the set of the above axioms by pointing out a solution based on the idea of the
well-known egalitarian solution as follows:
Theorem 1. Let f G : G → 2W\{∅} be a negotiation solution, where
- f G((C,1, . . . ,n)) = arg maxω∈LSmin(mG(ω)), where
- LS = max(BS , #), where
- BS = arg minω∈C(max(mG(ω))).
A negotiation solution f : G → 2W\{∅} satisﬁes UB, MA and LB iﬀ f = f G.
We also see the relation between the negotiation solution f G and the axioms IIA, PE, SYM as follows:
Proposition 3. The negotiation solution fG satisﬁes IIA, PE, and SYM.
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3.3. Logical properties
Given a negotiation game G = ({(Ki,i)|ai ∈ A}, μ) ∈ gA,LV , Xii is the preference of agent ai onW according to
an ordering strategy Xi ∈ {maxsat,vector,leximin}, and X = {X1, . . . , Xn}. Let ΔXμ (G) be a belief merging operator such
that Mod(ΔXμ (G)) = f
G((Mod(μ),X11 , . . . ,
Xn
n )). We call such operators the Negotiation-based Merging operators.
We need to modify some postulates for belief merging with integrity constraints (28) to accommodate the merging
on the stratiﬁed knowledge bases. In particular, postulates (IC2) and (IC3) should be modiﬁed as follows:
(IC2’) Let ∧G = ∧ai∈A ∧φ∈Ki φ, if ∧G ∧ μ is consistent then ΔXμ (G) ≡ ∧G ∧ μ.
(IC3’) Given two negotiation games G = ({(Ki,i)|ai ∈ A}, μ) and G′ = ({(K′i ,′i)|ai ∈ A}, μ′), (G,G′ ∈ gA,LV ), if
μ ≡ μ′ and there exists a permutation π on {1, . . . , n} such that (Ki,i) ≡ (K′π(i),′π(i)) and Xi = X′π(i) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} then ΔXμ (G) ≡ ΔX′μ′ (G′).
Proposition 4. If ΔXμ (G) is a Negotiation-based Merging operator, then ΔXμ (G) satisﬁes (IC0), (IC1), (IC2’), (IC5),
(IC7), (IC8).
If Xi ∈ {maxsat,vector} for all i then ΔXμ (G) also satisﬁes (IC3’).
We also have the relation between negotiation solutions according to the ordering strategies as follows:
Proposition 5. Given a negotiation game G = ({(Ki,i)|ai ∈ A}, μ) ∈ gA,LV , if Xi, X′i ∈ {maxsat,vector,leximin} and
Xi is more speciﬁc than X′i for all i = 1, . . . , n, then
fG((Mod(μ),X
′
1
1 , . . . ,
X′n
n )) ⊆ f G((Mod(μ),X11 , . . . ,Xnn )).
4. Computational complexity of belief merging by negotiation
In this sub-section, we discuss the computational complexity of the family of belief merging operators by negotia-
tion. Firstly, we consider the computational complexity of stratifyingW from a stratiﬁed belief base and an ordering
strategy. According to29, the problems for logical preference representation languages need to be taken into account
as follows:
Deﬁnition 6 (29). Given a stratiﬁed belief base (K,), an ordering strategy X, a formula φ and two interpretations ω
and ω′.
• The COMPARISON problem determines whether ω X ω′.
• The NON-DOMINANCE problem determines whether ω is non-dominated by X, i.e. there is not ω′ such that
ω′ ≺X ω.
We have a proposition for the ordering strategies presented in Subsection 3.1 as follows:
Proposition 6. Let (K,) be a stratiﬁed belief base and X be an ordering strategy. For X ∈ {maxsat, leximin, vector}
we have:
- COMPARISON is in P;
- NON-DOMINANCE is coNP − complete.
In order to stratifyW, we need to take into account the problem determining all non-dominated interpretations.
This problem is computationally much harder than the NON-DOMINANCE problem. To simplify the computation
of our merging operators, we assume that W is stratiﬁed from each stratiﬁed knowledge base during an oﬀ-line
preprocessing stage.
Let f be a negotiation solution, and we deﬁne the decision problem MER NEGO( f ) as follows:
Input: a tuple 〈E, μ, φ, X〉 where E = {(K1,1), . . . , (Kn,n)} is a belief set of stratiﬁed belief bases, μ and φ are
formulas, X = {X1, . . . , Xn} is set of ordering strategies (Xi is attached to Ki, respectively).
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Question: Does f (E, μ, X) |= φ hold?
Theorem 2. Let X = {X1, . . . , Xn}, where Xi ∈ {maxsat, leximin, vector} (i=1,. . . ,n). We have MER NEGO( f ) is
Θ
p
2 − complete.
Proof:
• Membership of MER NEGO( f ) in Θp2 is demonstrated by the following algorithm:
1. Determine the smallest k such that for all ω |= μ, li (ω) ≤ k by using binary search, resulting in O(log n)
calls to a S AT − oracle.
2. Determine the largest m such that for all ω |= μ, max(mod(ω), #) ≤ m, resulting in O(log n) calls to a
S AT − oracle.
3. Determine the largest n such that for all ω |= μ, li (ω) ≥ n by using binary search, resulting in O(log n)
calls to a S AT − oracle.
4. Determine whether an interpretation obtained by applying in sequence the above steps is a model of φ by
one call to a S AT − oracle.
• Hardness is proved by using the Θp2 − complete problem UOCS AT 30 stated as follows:
Given a set of clausesΦ, decide if all truth-assignments that satisfy a maximum number of clauses inΦ always
satisfy the same set of clauses in Φ.
We will prove that UOCS AT can be reducible to MER NEGO in polynomial time as follows. Suppose we
have an instance of UOCS AT Φ = {φ1, . . . , φm} over the variables p1, . . . , pn. Let c1, . . . , cm, cm+1, cm+2 be new
variables that have not occurred in Φ. We deﬁne:
- K = {{c1}, . . . , {cm}, {cm+1}, {¬cm+2}},
- μ = (φ1 ∨ ¬c1) ∧ . . . ∧ (φm ∨ ¬cm) ∧ cm+1 ∧ cm+2.
It is easy to see that by any ordering strategy in {maxsat, leximin, vector} each belief base Ki of K classiﬁesW
into two layers, one being the set of models of Ki and the other the set of the rest. Moreover, for all ω |= μ,
we also have ω |= cm+1 and ω |= ¬cm+2. Hence, for all ω ∈ W we always have max(li (ω)) = 2 = lm+2 (ω)
and min(li (ω)) = 1 = lm+1 (ω). Therefore, for all ω |= μ, ω ∈ f ((Mod(μ),1, . . . ,m+2)) if and only if
ω ∈ max(Mod(μ), #) if and only if ω satisﬁes a subset with maximal number of elements of Φ.
Similarly, we consider c′1, . . . , c
′
m be new variables that have not occurred in Φ and
- K′ = {{c′1}, . . . , {c′m}, {cm+1}, {¬cm+2}},
- μ′ = (φ1 ∨ ¬c′1) ∧ . . . ∧ (φm ∨ ¬c′m) ∧ cm+1 ∧ cm+2.
We also have: for all ω |= μ′, ω ∈ f ((Mod(μ′),′1, . . . ,′m,m+1,m+2)) if and only if ω ∈ max(Mod(μ′), #) if
and only if ω satisﬁes a subset with maximal number of elements of Φ.
Now we deﬁne:
- K∗ = K ⊔K′,
- μ∗ = μ ∧ μ′,
- φ = (c1 ≡ c′1) ∧ . . . ∧ (cm ≡ c′m).
Clearly, f ((Mod(μ∗),∗1, . . . ∗m+2)) “merges” each model on f ((Mod(μ),1, . . . m+2) on Var(K′)
⋃
Var(μ′)
with a model on f ((Mod(μ′),′1, . . . ′m,m+1,m+2)) on Var(K′)
⋃
Var(μ′). Therefore f (K∗, μ∗, X) |= φ if
and only if all truth assignments that satisfy a maximum number of clauses in Φ always satisfy the same set of
clauses in Φ.
Thus, MEG NEGO is θp2 − hard.
Therefore, MEG NEGO has θp2 membership and MEG NEGO is θ
p
2 − hard. It concludes that MEG NEGO is
θ
p
2 − complete.
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5. Conclusion
This paper proposed a two-stage model-based approach for belief merging by negotiation. The ﬁrst stage lets each
agent build its own preference on the set of possible outcomes from its stratiﬁed belief base and an ordering strategy.
The second stage allows the agents to negotiate with each other based on the constructed preferences to reach agree-
ment as the result of merging. A set of rational axioms for merging by negotiation is proposed and analyzed and a
negotiation solution that satisﬁes these axioms is identiﬁed. Especially, several signiﬁcant computational complexity
results are also presented, evaluated, and discussed. Although this paper has addressed the problem of belief merg-
ing by negotiation in both axiomatic and constructive models, it is necessary to consider the strategic model in the
negotiation stage. Moreover, the complexity of the merging process in the presence of strategic behaviours is also an
interesting topic to be investigated. We will explore these open issues in future works.
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